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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, several scholars have revisited the question of 
moral rights protections for creators of copyright works in the 
United States.  Their scholarship has focused on defining a moral 
rights agenda that comports with American constitutional values, 
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as well as being practically suited to current copyright business 
practices.  Much of this scholarship has prioritized a right of 
attribution over other moral rights, such as the right of integrity.  
This Article evaluates some of these recent moral rights models in 
light of a sample of comments made by American supernatural 
fiction authors about their works.  The Author questions whether 
the moral rights models advocated in modern discourse effectively 
fill the gaps between authors’ stated interests and the protections 
currently available under copyright law.  The Author also 
questions the extent to which authors’ rights should be elevated 
above others’ rights to enjoy and adapt their works. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The word create . . . derives from the Latin verb 
creo, which means “to give birth to.” . . . The 
concept that an author “gives birth” to her artistic 
creations provides the foundation for the 
insurmountable connection between an author and 
her work.1 
The United States has had a checkered history with moral 
rights legislation.  As a signatory to the Berne Convention,2 the 
United States is obliged to protect certain moral rights of authors 
of copyrighted works.3  However, since signing the Convention, it 
is unclear whether the United States has complied with those 
obligations.4  The government has maintained that existing 
 
 1 ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 13–14 (2010). 
 2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised at Paris 
July 24, 1971, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
 3 Id. art. 6bis; MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 389 (5th ed., 
2010) (describing the moral rights set out in the Berne Convention as the right of 
integrity—the right not to have a work mutilated or distorted—and the right of 
paternity—the right of the author to be acknowledged as the author of the work). 
 4 Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(1) (“Independently of the author’s 
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
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copyright, trademark, contract, defamation, privacy, and unfair 
competition laws,5 supplemented by provisions of the Visual 
Artists’ Rights Act (“VARA”),6 sufficiently comply with Article 
6bis—the moral rights provision.7  However, a number of 
commentators maintain that the United States is not in compliance 
with the Article.8  In recent years, copyright scholars have renewed 
the debate about the need for moral rights protections in the United 
 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”). 
 5 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 390 (“Although American copyright law has never 
adopted an integrated version of the moral right, some case law has come very close to 
achieving the same result in protecting certain aspects of the author’s integrity and 
paternity rights.  The leading case is Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., where 
plaintiff’s right to prevent distortion of his work was protected under both the copyright 
and unfair competition laws . . . . In addition to copyright and unfair competition laws, 
American authors have turned to contract, defamation, and privacy laws to protect other 
aspects of their artistic personality and reputation.” Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 6 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128. 
 7 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 380 (“Congress justified its decision not to adopt specific 
moral rights legislation, claiming that the United States already gives de facto recognition 
to moral rights when the entirety of American law is considered.  But serious doubts 
lingered about whether U.S. obligations under Berne had really been met, without 
specific recognition of moral rights.  The proponents of specific legislation quickly 
prevailed.  Congress responded by passing the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
(‘VARA’).”). 
 8 KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]here is the stark reality that [the United States] may 
not be in compliance with our [moral rights] obligations under the Berne Convention.”); 
LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 387 (noting that the United States has arguably not yet fulfilled 
its obligations under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention); see also id. at 393 
(“Ironically, VARA falls short of conforming to the requirements of the Berne 
Convention.  Most significantly, VARA specifies that protection lasts no longer than the 
life of [the] author whereas Berne requires that moral rights should be protected at least 
for the term of the related economic rights—which in the United States is the life of the 
author plus 70 years.”); Margaret Ann Wilkinson & Natasha Gerolami, The Author as 
Agent of Information Policy: The Relationship Between Economic and Moral Rights in 
Copyright, 26 GOV’T INFO. Q. 321, 327–30 (2009) (“The United States, which is now a 
signatory to the Berne Convention and leading proponent of strong foreign and 
international intellectual property protection, still does not have significant moral rights 
provisions in its copyright legislation. . . . [M]any believe that American law does not 
provide moral rights protection sufficient to satisfy the Berne Convention . . . despite the . 
. . passage of the limited Visual Artists’ Rights Act (1990).”) . 
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States, and have considered what such protections might look like 
in practice.9 
There are a number of reasons for the renewed interest in moral 
rights in recent years.  In particular, as noted by Professor Neil 
Netanel, digital technologies allow authors to relatively easily 
express their preferences for uses of their works online.10  This has 
already occurred in the copyright context, particularly under the 
Creative Commons License scheme.11  Creative Commons licenses 
enable authors to market their work with the freedoms they intend 
to bestow on subsequent users.12  Thus, a workable model already 
exists for authors to express their preferences about moral rights, if 
a broader moral rights agenda were to be adopted in the United 
States.  Another reason to revisit moral rights, also related to 
digital technology, is that Internet technologies have rapidly made 
the world a much smaller place.  Perceived disharmonizations in 
the law can be problematic when creators are now sharing their 
works online on a global scale.13 
This Article aims to synthesize some of the more recent digital 
developments involving copyright works with some of the relevant 
scholarship on moral rights in the United States.  The idea is to 
evaluate the extent to which some of the newly proposed moral 
rights models for the United States would address stated concerns 
of authors particularly with respect to downstream online uses of 
 
 9 See KWALL, supra note 1, at 147–65; NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S 
PARADOX 215–17 (2008). 
 10 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216 (“Digital technology may well ease the burden of 
compliance [with copyright and moral rights law].”). 
 11 Id. at 216–17 (noting use of Creative Commons licensing scheme for authors to 
express preferences in relation to online uses of their works). 
 12 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY, 277 (2008) (“Creative Commons [(“CC”)] gives authors free tools—legal 
tools (copyright licenses) and technical tools (metadata and simple marking 
technology)—to mark their creativity with the freedoms they intend it to carry.  So if 
you’re a teacher, and you want people to share your work, CC gives you a tool to signal 
this to others.  Or if you’re a photographer and don’t mind if others collect your work, but 
don’t want Time magazine to take your work without your permission, then CC would 
give you a license to signal this.”). 
 13 KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (“As of the close of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the United States appears to be rather isolated in its failure to recognize 
explicitly adequate moral rights.”). 
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their copyrighted works.  Part I examines the nature of moral rights 
and the checkered history of moral rights protections in the United 
States.  Part II addresses a small sample of comments made by 
authors of supernatural fiction about downstream uses of their 
works online.  These authorial concerns are not particularly well 
protected by current copyright laws, and the question arises 
whether moral rights would provide more appropriate protections.  
Supernatural fiction authors are chosen for examination because 
they tend to be very articulate in the blogosphere and often 
maintain active dialogue with their fans about preferred 
downstream uses of their works. 
Part III introduces some of the newer models for moral rights 
protections advocated in recent years by American copyright 
scholars Professors Neil Netanel and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall.  It 
examines the extent to which these models might effectively 
address some of the authorial concerns identified in Part II.  Part 
IV concludes with some comments about ways in which moral 
rights and copyright law could be developed in the future to better 
address some of these authorial concerns.  It further questions the 
extent to which authorial concerns should be allowed to dictate 
downstream uses of copyright works. 
I. MORAL RIGHTS: NATURE AND SCOPE 
A. Moral Rights versus Copyrights 
When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a 
sculptor, an architect or a musician, he does more 
than bring into the world a unique object having 
only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the 
world part of his personality and subjects it to the 
ravages of public use.  There are possibilities of 
injury to the creator other than merely economic 
ones; these the copyright statute does not protect.14 
 
 14 Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940). 
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Many commentators have noted that the economic rights 
protected by copyright law do not grant full protection for the 
kinds of interests a creator may want to assert in her work.15  
Copyright law is aimed at encouraging the production and 
dissemination of literary and artistic works by providing sufficient 
economic incentives to creators of those works.16  Copyright law 
prevents the unauthorized copying or dissemination of a protected 
work, thus preserving the incentives to create.17  If an author can 
secure control of the work in the marketplace, she may feel more 
confident creating and disseminating the work. 
However, copyrights do not fully capture the nature of the 
relationship between an author and her work.18  For one thing, 
copyrights are assignable,19 meaning that an author may not be in a 
position to control downstream uses of a work post-assignment.  In 
fact, in jurisdictions where moral rights are available, authors will 
often invoke those rights against a copyright owner: that is, a 
person to whom the copyright has been assigned.20 
Further, creators of copyright works engage in their artistic 
endeavors for reasons other than pecuniary reward.  Some authors 
 
 15 See, e.g., id. (“The copyright law, of course, protects the economic exploitation of 
the fruits of artistic creation; but the economic, exploitive aspect of the problem is only 
one of its many facets . . . .”); Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 321 (“[T]he 
economic rights of copyright, though identified with an author, do not, in and of 
themselves, protect the relationship between the author and the text.”). 
 16 Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 322 (“The stated purpose of copyright has 
long been taken to be to encourage the production and dissemination of works thereby 
increasing access to information.”). 
 17 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (setting out the exclusive rights of copyright holders); 
Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 321 (“The economic rights grant the copyright 
holders exclusive privilege to make various uses of a work including copying, publishing, 
performing, translating, and adapting the work.”). 
 18 Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 321 (“[T]he economic rights of copyright, 
though identified with an author, do not, in and of themselves, protect the relationship 
between the author and the text.”). 
 19 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 204; Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 322 
(“[Copyrights] are transferable and, therefore, the author, at any given time, is not 
necessarily the rights holder.”). 
 20 Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 8, at 328 (“Moral rights can be invoked by an 
author to oppose an economic rights holder’s exploitation of the work in a way deemed to 
harm the reputation of the author.”). 
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“write for glory and fame,”21 others for the sake of the purely 
creative process in and of itself.22  In the software industry, for 
example, it has been recognized that motivations such as 
“intellectual stimulation and enjoyment of the creative process” are 
drivers of innovation in software coding, often more so than 
financial rewards or career advancement.23  Professor Kwall has 
identified a number of situations where creators are spurred by an 
intrinsic urge to create rather than by any expectation of financial 
reward.24  She cites as examples of this phenomenon: “the cave 
drawings of prehistoric man, the artistic creations of inmates on 
death row, and the works of authorship produced by the inhabitants 
of the Nazi death camps during World War II.”25 
Given the diverse motivations for creation and the variety of 
relationships authors have with their creations, a law that focuses 
purely on the protection of economic rights will miss important 
elements of the creative process.  This was realized towards the 
beginning of the nineteenth century in Europe.26  Since that time, 
moral rights have developed throughout both civil and common 
law jurisdictions.27  Moral rights are further reflected in several 
international treaties.28  The one notable exception is that moral 
 
 21 Roeder, supra note 14, at 566 (“[A]uthors write for glory and fame as well as for 
pecuniary advantage . . . .”). 
 22 KWALL, supra note 1, at 11 (“[M]any artists create for the sake of the creative 
process rather than to generate profits.”). 
 23 Id. at 11–12 (quoting SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND 
AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 117 (2005)). 
 24 Id. at 20. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Roeder, supra note 14, at 555 (“The [moral rights] doctrine has been best expressed 
and studied in France.  As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century cases are 
found which, emphasizing the criminal statutes against plagiarism, protected the right of 
the creator to have the form of his work preserved from deformation by subsequent 
transferees.”); see also KWALL, supra note 1, at 39 (noting the early development of 
moral rights in France in the nineteenth century). 
 27 KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (noting the existence of substantive moral rights laws in 
both civil and common law jurisdictions outside the United States). 
 28 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis; WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty of 1996 art. 5(1), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76 
[hereinafter WIPO Treaty] (“Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural 
performances or performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be 
identified as the performer of his performances, except where omission is dictated by the 
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rights are not included in the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”).29 
Moral rights can encompass a variety of different elements of 
the author’s relationship with her work, and the exact scope of the 
rights differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.30  The relevant 
international treaties—the Berne Convention, and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty31—focus on two distinct rights: the right of 
attribution or paternity,32 and the right of integrity.33  These rights 
are the focus of the remainder of this discussion. 
However, it is worth noting that some civil jurisdictions 
maintain a broader array of moral rights.  Courts in a number of 
civil law jurisdictions have recognized additional rights such as the 
right to refuse to create, the right to create and publish in any form 
desired, the right to withdraw or destroy the work, the prohibition 
against excessive criticism, and the prohibition against other 
injuries to the creator’s personality.34  Even the more well accepted 
rights of integrity and attribution vary in nature and scope from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.35 
 
manner of the use of the performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation.”) . 
 29 KWALL, supra note 1, at 37 (“Although the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) incorporates the Berne Convention and 
provides for sanctions for noncompliance, the United States insured that Article 6bis was 
excluded from the ‘rights and obligations’ TRIPs delineates.”). 
 30 Id. at 38 (“Moral rights . . . remain ‘chiefly a matter of national law.’  Historically, 
there has been a divergence in moral rights protection between civil and common law 
traditions, although recently the majority of common law jurisdictions have enacted 
moral rights protections to some degree.”). 
 31 See WIPO Treaty, supra note 28.  
 32 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 389 (describing the right of paternity as “the right to be 
acknowledged as an author of the work”). 
 33 Id. (describing the right of integrity as “the right that the work not be mutilated or 
distorted”). 
 34 Roeder, supra note 14, at 556 (summarizing these rights); see also KWALL, supra 
note 1, at 44 (describing the right of disclosure and the right of withdrawal available in 
some civil law jurisdictions). 
 35 KWALL, supra note 1, at 42–45 (noting differences of application in the law relating 
to attribution and integrity in specific cases in France and Germany). 
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B. The Rights of Attribution and Integrity 
Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention obligates signatory 
countries to protect an author’s rights of attribution or paternity, 
and of integrity: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and 
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author 
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.36 
The language protecting the “right to claim authorship of the 
work” is generally referred to as an attribution or paternity right.37  
The language pertaining to an author’s right to object to 
distortions, mutilations, modifications and other derogatory actions 
in relation to a work is generally referred to as the right of 
integrity.38  All Berne signatories must, at a minimum, protect 
these rights, although nothing precludes a signatory country from 
adopting a broader moral rights agenda.39 
 
 36 Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis. 
 37 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 389. 
 38 Id. 
 39 KWALL, supra note 1, at 44 (describing moral rights recognized in European 
jurisdictions outside of the Berne Convention requirements); LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 
389 (noting that traditional European formulations of moral rights would generally 
include the right of disclosure as well as potentially the right of withdrawal, the right of 
modification and the right to prevent excessive criticism); Roeder, supra note 14, at 556 
(“The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a rapid development of the [moral 
rights] concept.  The right to refuse to create, the right of paternity, the right to prevent 
deformation of the work, all received recognition in civil courts . . . . The various 
ramifications of the doctrine have been constantly developed in Europe and, in addition 
to the rights already mentioned, the moral right may now be said to consist of the right to 
create and publish in any form desired, the creator’s right to claim the paternity of his 
work, the right to prevent every deformation, mutilation or other modification thereof, the 
right to withdraw and destroy the work, the prohibition against excessive criticism, and 
the prohibition against all other injuries to the creator’s personality.”). 
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The language of Article 6bis(1) leaves some questions open 
even with respect to the rights of attribution and integrity.40  For 
example, it is unclear whether the right to “claim authorship” of 
the work includes the right not to be identified as the author of a 
work.  In a discussion of anonymous authors, pseudonymous 
authors, ghost writers, and collective works, Professor Kwall notes 
that: “an author’s decision to write anonymously or under a 
pseudonym can be viewed as a branding choice that is a 
fundamental part of the author’s meaning and message.”41  If the 
aim of the attribution right is to protect the author’s meaning and 
message,42 then one might argue that the author has a right not to 
be identified as the author of the work—at least in cases where 
anonymity or pseudonymity is essential to the author’s meaning 
and message. 
It is also unclear from the wording of Article 6bis(1) whether 
destruction of a work by a copyright holder falls within the scope 
of the right of integrity.  The Convention requires that an author 
should have the right to object to “distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action” in relation to the 
work.43  It is unclear whether or not this encompasses destruction 
of the work, particularly in cases where the destruction does not 
affect the “honor or reputation” of the author.44  In fact, many 
countries with well developed moral rights laws do not protect 
authors against destruction of a work,45 although the Swiss law 
 
 40 KWALL, supra note 1, at 89 (noting unclear history of interpretation of the Visual 
Artists’ Rights Act and the Berne Convention as to whether a right of anonymity or 
pseudonymity should be protected as part of the right of attribution). 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. at 87 (noting that the primary objective of moral rights might be to safeguard the 
meaning and message of the author’s work). 
 43 Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(1). 
 44 KWALL, supra note 1, at 44–45 (“Perhaps the underlying rationale for the failure of 
most countries to prevent destructions of works of art is that a work that has been 
destroyed completely cannot reflect adversely upon the creator’s honor or reputation.  Of 
course, this explanation is not relevant to those instances where a work is destroyed in a 
manner that subjects the creator to shame or embarrassment.” (citations omitted)). 
 45 Id.; Roeder, supra note 14, at 569 (“The right to prevent deformation does not 
include the right to prevent destruction of a created work.  The doctrine of moral right 
finds one social basis in the need of a creator for protection of his honor and reputation.  
To deform his work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work that is not his 
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requires an owner of an artwork to offer to sell it back to its creator 
prior to destroying it.46 
Other issues left open by Article 6bis include the duration of 
moral rights.  Article 6bis(2) provides that the rights of attribution 
and integrity generally must be maintained after the death of the 
author at least until the expiry of the economic rights in a work.47  
However, there is no further guidance on the appropriate duration 
of moral rights.  It is unclear whether, or to what extent, moral 
rights should endure after the expiration of copyright in a given 
work.  Professor Kwall has suggested that moral rights protections 
should not, in fact, endure beyond the original creator’s death.48  
This is because of her view that moral rights protect the author’s 
intended “meaning and message” of her work and that no one’s 
judgment about the meaning and message—not even that of the 
author’s descendants—can be substituted for the author’s own 
judgment.49  She also believes that limiting the duration of moral 
rights to the term of the original author’s life will mitigate free 
speech concerns, including concerns about maintaining a vibrant 
public domain of information and ideas.50  Of course, this approach 
 
own, and thus make him subject to criticism for work he has not done; the destruction of 
his work does not have this result.”). 
 46 KWALL, supra note 1, at 44. 
 47 Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(2) (“The rights granted to the author in 
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or 
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.  
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or 
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of 
all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights 
may, after his death, cease to be maintained.”). 
 48 KWALL, supra note 1, at 159 (“[F]rom a theoretical standpoint, moral rights 
protection should exist for the author’s lifetime, but not beyond.”). 
 49 Id. at 160 (“No one, not even the author’s spouse and children, can substitute a 
personal judgment regarding the substance of the author’s meaning and message of her 
work.  Therefore, the author functions as the guardian of the work’s original meaning and 
message during her lifetime.”). 
 50 Id. (“Moreover, a duration equivalent to the author’s life reinforces a vibrant public 
domain.”); id. at 54 (“At the risk of vast oversimplification, the concept of the public 
domain in intellectual property law entails common ownership by the public as a whole 
of the property comprising the public domain.  This means that each member of the 
public has a ‘property interest’ and ‘an equal right to adapt and transform the material in 
question.’”); see also JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF 
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is not consistent with the requirements of the Berne Convention, as 
Professor Kwall acknowledges.51 
It is also unclear from the wording of Article 6bis whether the 
rights of attribution and integrity should be transferable or 
waivable.  Most theorists agree that moral rights are not 
transferable, unlike copyrights.52  This is because copyrights are in 
effect a property or quasi-property right53 while moral rights are 
personal rights.54  However, in effect, allowing waiver of moral 
rights—which many countries do55—is tantamount to allowing a 
transfer, in the sense that the author agrees to give up a right she 
could otherwise exercise.  Like a transfer, the waiver will generally 
operate to the benefit of a third party copyright holder who may 
 
THE MIND 38 (2008) (describing the public domain as “material that is not covered by 
intellectual property rights”). 
 51 See KWALL, supra note 1, at 160 (“One possible difficulty with this position, 
however, is that my recommended period of protection is not consistent with the Berne 
Convention’s recommendation, the norms in the international community, or with the 
entirety of VARA.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 14, at 564 (“Moral rights are personal rights; they are 
not based on any theory of property, for whatever ‘property’ the creator may possess 
exists in the rights protected by the copyright statute.  Moral rights are akin to those 
rights in tort which protect the individual against injury.  They may not, therefore, be 
assigned . . . .”); KWALL, supra note 1, at 50–51 (noting that in Canada moral rights 
cannot be assigned but they can be waived). But see KWALL, supra note 1, at 35 (noting 
that in some civil law countries, such as France, authors’ moral rights are often treated as 
a special category of property that cannot be waived or transferred); NETANEL, supra note 
9, at 215 (noting that the continental European model of moral rights accords authors 
inalienable rights to control “the timing and manner in which their creative works are 
disseminated to the public”). 
 53 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (describing conditions for “ownership” and “transfer” of 
copyrights). 
 54 Roeder, supra note 14, at 564 (“Moral rights are personal rights; they are not based 
on any theory of property . . . .”). 
 55 See KWALL, supra note 1, at 50–51 (describing the waiver systems adopted in 
common law jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada); Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra 
note 8, at 329 (“[I]nternationally, there has been a trend which may reflect increasing 
neglect of moral rights rather than an embracing of these provisions.  Even in countries 
where moral rights provisions exist, such as Canada, moral rights may have suffered 
erosion.  Canada, for example, in its 1988 amendments, introduced a waiver clause to its 
moral rights legislation.  Such a clause may greatly weaken the rights of authors because 
they may easily be required to waive their rights as a condition of publication . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
C01_LIPTON_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:40 PM 
2011] MORAL RIGHTS AND SUPERNATURAL FICTION 549 
want to exploit the protected work in a manner inconsistent with 
the original author’s preferences. 
Professor Kwall has suggested that ideally moral rights should 
not be waivable for two reasons.  First, because theoretically it 
makes no sense to waive a right that is intended to preserve 
authorship dignity,56 and, second, because allowing waiver of 
moral rights exacerbates disparities of bargaining power between 
creators and those with whom they contract.57 
One final issue which is left ambiguous by the wording of 
Article 6bis is the precise relationship between the two rights 
contemplated in the Article.  The wording seems to indicate that 
the rights of attribution and integrity are two distinct rights and, 
indeed, certain elements, like the notion of damage to the author’s 
“honor or reputation” are limited to the right of integrity.  
However, there is clearly some overlap between the rights.  As 
some scholars have noted, the notion of attribution clearly impacts 
on a work’s meaning and message.58  Thus, the attribution right 
often does very similar work to the right of integrity in preserving 
the author’s intended meaning and message. 
This was recognized as early as 1910 in the case of Clemens v. 
Press Publishing Co.59 where Judge Seabury noted the relationship 
between the right of attribution and the integrity of the author’s 
artistic vision: 
 
 56 KWALL, supra note 1, at 156–57 (“[F]ormal waivers should be inoperative as a 
general matter.  Given that moral rights are designed to recognize inspirational 
motivations for creativity, any system sanctioning waiver is inconsistent from a 
theoretical standpoint with the justifications for adopting these protections.  In other 
words, if moral rights protections are intended to redress violations of authorship dignity, 
they should not be capable of being waived.  An author always should be in a position to 
inform the public that a publicly displayed or distributed version of her work does not 
comport with her artistic vision . . . .”). 
 57 Id. at 157 (“[A]llowing waiver exacerbates the disparity of bargaining power 
between authors and those with whom they contract.”). 
 58 Id. at 89 (“There is good reason for [the] view . . . that an author’s decision to write 
anonymously or under a pseudonym can be viewed as a branding choice that is a 
fundamental part of the author’s meaning and message.”). 
 59 67 Misc. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910).  For a discussion of this case, see Roeder, supra 
note 14, at 562–63. 
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If the intent of the parties was that the defendant 
should purchase the rights to the literary property 
and publish it, the author is entitled not only to be 
paid for his work, but to have it published in the 
manner in which he wrote it.  The purchaser cannot 
garble it or put it out under another name than the 
author’s; nor can he omit altogether the name of the 
author, unless his contract with the latter permits 
him to do so.60 
Professor Marshall Leaffer similarly recognizes the 
relationship between the two rights set out in Article 6bis in noting 
that the right of attribution encompasses the right “to prevent the 
use of [the artist’s] name as the author of the work in the event of a 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work that would 
be prejudicial to her honor or reputation.”61  By linking the notion 
of attribution with that of distortions of the work that are 
prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation, Professor Leaffer 
emphasizes the link between the rights of attribution and integrity. 
In summary, it is clear that Article 6bis contemplates the 
existence of personal rights in the creator of a copyright work that 
are separate to copyright and that protect different aspects of the 
creator’s relationship with the work than copyright.  However, the 
precise interpretation of Article 6bis, and the way in which 
signatory countries choose to implement its provisions, varies 
widely.  Resulting divergences in opinion on the nature and scope 
of the rights of attribution and integrity are important in 
considering whether and how enhanced moral rights protections 
might be developed within the United States. 
The remainder of this article considers some comments that 
modern authors have made about the kinds of rights they would 
like to protect in their works, and some recent moral rights models 
that have been advocated by scholars in the United States.  The 
aim is to analyze the extent to which these newly advocated moral 
rights models effectively address recently articulated authorial 
concerns about protection of aspects of their works.  This article 
 
 60 Clemens, 67 Misc. at 184. 
 61 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 395. 
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focuses on authors of popular supernatural fiction as one subset of 
authors who have been extremely articulate about downstream uses 
of their work. 
II. WHAT (SUPERNATURAL FICTION) AUTHORS WANT 
I do not allow fan fiction.  The characters are 
copyrighted.  It upsets me terribly to even think 
about fan fiction with my characters.  I advise my 
readers to write your own original stories with your 
own characters.  It is absolutely essential that you 
respect my wishes.62 
These words by the reigning queen of vampire fiction, Anne 
Rice,63 are an interesting example of an author articulating her 
perceived or preferred rights in relation to her popularly released 
works.  In particular, she voices concerns about fan fiction.64  Fan 
fiction involves fans of an original work writing their own 
prequels, sequels and re-tellings of the original stories from 
different points of view.65  More often than not, fan fiction is not 
authorized by the creator of the original work, although some 
creators now welcome fan fiction, but may attempt to impose 
certain restrictions on its later use and dissemination.66  Despite 
Rice’s words, it is unclear in the United States whether or not fan 
 
 62 Anne Rice, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, ANNERICE.COM: THE OFFICIAL SITE, 
http://www.annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-MessagesToFans.html (last visited Sept. 14, 
2009). 
 63 Author of The Vampire Chronicles: INTERVIEW WITH THE VAMPIRE (1976); THE 
VAMPIRE LESTAT (1985); THE QUEEN OF THE DAMNED (1988); THE TALE OF THE BODY 
THIEF (1992); MEMNOCH, THE DEVIL (1995); THE VAMPIRE ARMAND (1998); MERRICK 
(2000); BLOOD AND GOLD (2001); BLACKWOOD FARM (2002); BLOOD CANTICLE (2003). 
See Anne Rice, All Books, In Order, ANNERICE.COM: THE OFFICIAL SITE, 
http://www.annerice.com/Bookshelf-AllBooksInOrder.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 64 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory 
of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 598 n.6 (2007) (defining 
“fan fiction” as “fiction about characters or settings written by fans of the original work, 
rather than the original creators”). 
 65 Id. 
 66 HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 
152 (2006) (“In 2000, Lucasfilm offered Star Wars fans free Web space 
(www.starwars.com) and unique content for their sites, but only under the condition that 
whatever they created would become the studio’s intellectual property.”). 
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fiction infringes an original author’s copyright.67  Most likely, the 
answer to this question will depend on the facts of a given case.  It 
is also unclear under American copyright law whether or not 
fictional characters can in fact be copyrighted, as asserted by 
Rice.68 
Assuming her characters are copyrightable, Rice is probably 
correct in her assumption that readers who create fan fiction using 
her characters without her authorization will be infringing her 
copyright.  The question for this discussion is whether copyright 
really gets to the heart of the interests that Rice is attempting to 
assert.  Even though she frames her concerns in terms of the 
copyrightability of her characters, copyright is intended to protect 
economic rights of the author, rather than her personal rights in her 
work.69  From Rice’s comments, it appears that her concerns are 
more personal than proprietary.  She notes that it “upsets [her] 
terribly” to think about others creating fan fiction with her 
characters.70  This wording suggests more of a personal injury or 
violation than a concern with proprietary benefits.  She is not 
asserting that her fans are making unjust financial profits by using 
her characters.  In fact, fan fiction is generally not sold 
commercially in competition with the author of the original work.71 
Thus, Rice’s stated concerns do not appear to be commercial or 
proprietary in nature.  Rather they appear to be personal—the idea 
 
 67 Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2009) (noting the debate as to whether fan fiction and 
online remixing is a copyright infringement or excusable fair use); Dennis Karjala, Harry 
Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 32–34 
(2006) (noting conflicting case law in the Harry Potter lexicon about the extent to which 
works based on the Harry Potter books are either regarded as copyright infringements or 
excusable fair uses). 
 68 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (noting that there is some uncertainty about whether 
fictional characters are copyrightable, although the currently prevailing view is that 
sufficiently well defined characters are copyrightable); Karjala, supra note 67, at 24–26 
(describing the historical development of American courts’ attitudes towards 
copyrighting fictional characters). 
 69 See LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 2. 
 70 Rice, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, supra note 62. 
 71 Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1885 (“Within the fan-fiction community, there is a norm 
against seeking commercial gain.”). 
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that the fans have violated her personal dignity in some way.  Even 
the way Rice says that it is “absolutely essential that you respect 
my wishes” suggests an emotive attachment to her work, rather 
than a pecuniary motivation behind her concerns.72  The language 
is that of a creator seeking to protect the artistic integrity of her 
creation, rather than of a commercial actor seeking to protect her 
bottom line.  Thus, even though her concerns are expressed in 
copyright language, they contain significant moral rights 
undertones.  It may be that Rice uses copyright language precisely 
because there is no moral rights protection for fictional works in 
the United States.73  Copyright is thus the closest legal right she 
can assert, short of simply appealing to her fans’ good faith in 
respecting her wishes. 
Rice is not alone in articulating her strong views about fan 
fiction.  Another vampire novelist, Charlaine Harris, creator of the 
popular Sookie Stackhouse novels,74 has this to say on her website 
in response to an author query about fan fiction: 
Q. Can I post my cool story about Sookie on this 
site? 
A. No, and I’ll tell you why. No fanfic can appear 
on this website. Not only does it make me feel 
strange to have other people use my characters, but 
there are legal issues to consider.75 
Harris’s comments differ from Rice’s in several ways, although 
her concerns about fan fiction seem very similar.  Like Rice, Harris 
 
 72 Rice, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, supra note 62.  
 73 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 393 (“The Visual Artists Rights Act is limited in its 
subject matter and scope and is essentially confined to the protection of works of fine art.  
Qualifying works include those that exist in a single copy, such as original paintings, 
drawings, prints, sculptures, or works existing in signed and consecutively numbered 
editions of no more than 200 copies.”). 
 74 DEAD UNTIL DARK (2001); LIVING DEAD IN DALLAS (2002); CLUB DEAD (2003); 
DEAD TO THE WORLD (2004); DEAD AS A DOORNAIL (2005); DEFINITELY DEAD (2006); 
ALL TOGETHER DEAD (2007); FROM DEAD TO WORSE (2008); DEAD AND GONE (2009); 
DEAD IN THE FAMILY (2010); see also Charlaine Harris, Bibliography: The Sookie 
Stackhouse aka Southern Vampire Series, CHARLAINEHARRIS.COM, http://www. 
charlaineharris.com/bibliography/bibliog-sookie.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).  
 75 Charlaine Harris, Frequently Asked Questions, CHARLAINEHARRIS.COM, 
http://www.charlaineharris.com/faqs.html (last visited July 14, 2010). 
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utilizes emotive language in saying that it makes her “feel strange” 
to have others use her characters.  Unlike Rice, she refers obliquely 
to “legal issues” without specifying copyright law in particular.  
Harris also limits her comments to the question whether she herself 
is prepared to host fan fiction on her own website.  Unlike Rice, 
Harris does not purport to ban fans from writing their own stories, 
but simply says she would feel strange hosting those stories on her 
website.  It is possible that the legal issues she is referring to relate 
to contractual agreements with her publishers not to endorse any 
competing works.  Hosting such works on her website may 
potentially contravene contracts with her publishers, although this 
is not immediately obvious from her online comments. 
Whether or not Harris’s reference to legal issues is intended to 
imply copyright, trademark or contract law, she is clearly not 
referring to moral rights as American moral rights law does not 
cover fictional writings.76  However, as with Rice’s comments, 
Harris’s comments do connote concerns generally associated with 
moral rights.  She seeks to protect her own authorial dignity and 
her emotional investment in characters she has created.  Of course 
Harris, like Rice, has licensed others to use her characters in 
various media.  Harris’s characters and plotlines form the basis of 
the popular HBO Television Series, True Blood.77  Rice authorized 
the use of her characters and storylines in a Broadway musical: 
LESTAT.78  Thus, both authors are sufficiently savvy to utilize 
copyright law to protect their work in the commercial context even 
outside the traditional book-publishing arena.  Their concern is not 
with lack of economic control over their works.  Their stated 
concerns to fans have to do with something much more personal 
than money. 
We see the same pattern again and again on creators’ blogs.  
Another extremely popular vampire author, Stephenie Meyer, 
 
 76 See LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 393 (noting limited cover of VARA to particular sub-
categories of the fine arts). 
 77 See Trueblood: About, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/true-blood/index.html#/true-
blood/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 78 Anne Rice, LESTAT on Broadway, ANNERICE.COM: THE OFFICIAL SITE, 
http://www.annerice.com/Lestat-TheMusical.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
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creator of the Twilight books,79 has voiced similar concerns, albeit 
in a somewhat different context.  As with Rice and Harris, Meyer 
has been extremely successful at commercializing her work both 
through publication of her books and through licensing 
reproductions in different media—notably movies80 and graphic 
novels.81  However, she, too has had issues with fans making 
unauthorized use of her work.  In Meyer’s case, the concern has 
not been so much with fan fiction as she does not specifically 
mention fan fiction on her website, although she has made some 
comments about fan fiction in interviews.82  In the interview 
context, she has described being of two minds about fan fiction.  
On the one hand she is interested in seeing what people come up 
with,83 and she confesses to writing her own brand of 
parody/fiction based on her own published novels.84  On the other 
hand, she suggests that fans who are good creative writers should 
 
 79 TWILIGHT (2005); NEW MOON (2006); ECLIPSE (2007); BREAKING DAWN (2008); see 
also Stephenie Meyer, Twilight Series, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER, 
http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/twilightseries.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 80 TWILIGHT (Summit Entertainment 2008); NEW MOON (Summit Entertainment 2009); 
ECLIPSE (Summit Entertainment 2010); see also  Box Office/Business for Twilight, 
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1099212/business (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2010); Box Office/Business for New Moon, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1259571/business (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); Box 
Office/Business for Eclipse, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt1099212/business (last visted Jan. 18, 2010).  
 81 1  STEPHENIE MEYER & YOUNG KIM, TWILIGHT: THE GRAPHIC NOVEL (2010); see 
also George Gene Gustines, A World of Words Reinvented in Pictures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
9, 2010, at C1. 
 82 Alison Genet, Stephenie Meyer Talks “Twilight” Fan Fiction & “Breaking Down” 
(Her Own Private FF), TWIFANS (July 7, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.twifans 
.com/profiles/blogs/stephenie-meyer-talks-twilight. 
 83 Id. (“Fan-fiction has become kind of a mixed thing for me.  Like in the beginning I 
hadn’t heard of it and there were some that were . . . I couldn’t read the ones that had the 
characters IN character.  It freaked me out.  [U]m, but I liked. . . . [T]here was one about 
Harry Potter and Twilight that was hilarious.  And then there was one that was about a 
girl who was starring as Bella in the movie and that was funny.  And uh, I hear so many 
people arguing about fan-fiction.”). 
 84 Id. (“Breaking Down was actually a project for a while.  There was a while where 
you get burned out, we came up with an alternate Breaking Dawn called Breaking Down 
(laughs).  It was awesome!  Complete spiraling downward & destruction in Bella 
Swan[’]s life & everyone around her.  Charlie became a meth addict.”). 
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develop their own plots and characters that they can own and sell 
without worrying about infringing other people’s copyrights.85 
However, the one concern she raises on her own website—as 
well as discussing in interviews86—is a situation involving an 
unpublished and incomplete manuscript that was distributed over 
the Internet without her authorization.  The manuscript was entitled 
Midnight Sun and was a retelling of the original first book—
Twilight—from another character’s perspective.87  Twilight is 
narrated from the perspective of the series heroine, Bella Swan,88 
while Midnight Sun retells the Twilight story from the point of 
view of her love interest, the vampire Edward Cullen.89 
When she was about half way through the manuscript, she 
released the draft to certain people involved in the film adaptation 
of the first book so they could get a better idea of the backstory 
behind the character of Edward.  Subsequently, the manuscript was 
leaked on the Internet without Meyer’s authorization.  Meyer was 
so upset by this unauthorized leak that she gave up work on the 
book and never completed it,90 although she did post an “official” 
 
 85 Id. (“As long as the writers of it, move on from it.  I think it’s sad to spend so much 
energy on something you can’t own.  And that makes me a little bit sad because all these 
talented kids should be, ya know, get your story out from under the bed and get it out 
there.”). 
 86 Id. (“The whole Midnight Sun . . . mess, came about because, when you first get 
started, you really want people to read your book & give you feedback and no one’s ever 
gonna care, like you don’t have to worry about leaks.  That’s such a crazy idea.  With MS 
you know, I had a readers group and we all read each other’s stuff and that’s very normal.  
I saw a lot of feedback, like ‘she shouldn’t be giving her stuff out,’ but 10 years ago 
before anybody knew that had ever read Twilight, did you ever think anyone was gonna 
care or look for this crap?  Absolutely not.”). 
 87 See Midnight Sun: Twilight with Edward as the Narrator, TWILIGHT NEWS SITE 
(Feb. 21, 2010), http://twilightnewssite.com/news-twilight-new-moon-eclipse-breaking-
dawn/midnight-sun-twilight-with-edward-as-narrator. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Stephenie Meyer, Midnight Sun: Edward’s Version of Twilight, 
STEPHENIEMEYER.COM (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun. 
html (“So where does this leave Midnight Sun?  My first feeling was that there was no 
way to continue.  Writing isn’t like math; in math, two plus two always equals four no 
matter what your mood is like.  With writing, the way you feel changes everything.  If I 
tried to write Midnight Sun now, in my current frame of mind, James would probably win 
and all the Cullens would die, which wouldn’t dovetail too well with the original story.  
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version of the incomplete manuscript on her website.91  
Accompanying that post, she had this to say: 
I did not want my readers to experience Midnight 
Sun before it was completed, edited and published.  
I think it is important for everybody to understand 
that what happened was a huge violation of my 
rights as an author, not to mention me as a human 
being.  As the author of the Twilight Saga, I control 
the copyright and it is up to the owner of the 
copyright to decide when the books should be made 
public; this is the same for musicians and 
filmmakers.  Just because someone buys a book or 
movie or song, or gets a download off the Internet, 
doesn’t mean that they own the right to reproduce 
and distribute it.  Unfortunately, with the Internet, it 
is easy for people to obtain and share items that do 
not legally belong to them.  No matter how this is 
done, it is still dishonest.  This has been a very 
upsetting experience for me, but I hope it will at 
least leave my fans with a better understanding of 
copyright and the importance of artistic control.92 
As with Anne Rice’s post about fan fiction, Meyer here 
expresses her concerns in the language of copyright, even though 
she characterizes the harm she has suffered as much more personal 
than economic in nature.  She talks about her rights being violated 
both as an author and a human being.  This connotes concern with 
a dignitary harm rather than a pecuniary harm.  She also talks 
about the “dishonesty” of the people who posted her manuscript 
 
In any case, I feel too sad about what has happened to continue working on Midnight Sun, 
and so it is on hold indefinitely.”). 
 91 Id. (“I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight Sun.  It was only an 
incomplete draft; the writing is messy and flawed and full of mistakes.  But how do I 
comment on this violation without driving more people to look for the illegal posting?  It 
has taken me a while to decide how and if I could respond.  But to end the confusion, I’ve 
decided to make the draft available here (at the end of this post).  This way, my readers 
don’t have to feel they have to make a sacrifice to stay honest.  I hope this fragment gives 
you further insight into Edward’s head and adds a new dimension to the Twilight story.  
That’s what inspired me to write it in the first place.”). 
 92 Id. 
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without her authorization.  Dishonesty is not an element of a 
copyright claim at all.  Direct copyright infringement is a strict 
liability wrong,93 and the defendant’s state of mind—honest or 
dishonest—is irrelevant.  Again, this seems to be more of a 
personal than an economic issue for Meyer.  As with Rice and 
Harris, Meyer also talks about how “upsetting” the experience has 
been for her when someone has made an unauthorized non-
commercial use of her work. 
Unlike the fan fiction situations troubling Rice and Harris, 
however, Meyer could potentially also suffer economic harm if an 
early draft of her manuscript is available online and she later 
commercially publishes an official version.  It is conceivable that 
someone might read the version available online, decide they do 
not like it, and not bother to buy the final version, when otherwise 
they may have bought it.  Of course, it is equally possible—and 
probably more likely—that her fans would have been titillated by 
the online draft into buying the final published version to see what 
happens next and perhaps to compare the early draft with the final 
product. 
Towards the end of the above quote, Meyer links the idea of 
fans “understanding copyright law” with the notion of fans 
understanding “the importance of artistic control.”  In actual fact, 
copyright law tends to have very little to do with artistic control, 
particularly in circumstances where the original creator has 
assigned the copyright to a publisher or other distributor.  While an 
author who retains copyright in her work may use it as a tool to 
protect her artistic integrity, in the absence of moral rights 
protections, an author who assigns her copyright will be out of luck 
unless she can convince the assignee to threaten or sue an alleged 
infringer.  This again indicates the mismatch between the aims of 
copyright law and the kinds of interests authors may seek to 
protect in relation to their works. 
 
 93 17 U.S.C. § 501(a); see also Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict 
Liability in Copyright, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 351 (2002). 
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III. EVALUATING NEW MORAL RIGHTS MODELS 
A. American Resistance to Moral Rights 
[C]omprehensive [moral rights] legislation is likely 
to be ill-advised.  It is likely to be impracticable in 
its application, to be unsettling in its impact upon 
longstanding contractual and business 
arrangements, to threaten investment in and public 
dissemination of the arts, to sharply conflict with 
fundamental United States legal principles of 
copyright, contract, property and even constitutional 
law, and ultimately to stifle much artistic creativity 
while resulting in only the most speculative 
incentives to such creativity.94 
The question for the remainder of this Article is whether a 
moral rights agenda might help authors protect some of the aspects 
of their works that are currently not very well protected by 
copyright law.  Several scholars have recently advocated new 
moral rights models for the United States that would accommodate 
First Amendment concerns as well as associated concerns about 
protecting the public domain of information and ideas from over-
propertization.95  Before examining these recent moral rights 
models, it is worth briefly addressing the historical concerns within 
the United States about moral rights, and the explanations for why 
the United States has not been more pro-active in developing a 
moral rights agenda, despite signing the Berne Convention. 
The United States has a strong First Amendment tradition 
which includes preserving works within the public domain for 
general use.  Those opposed to moral rights are concerned about a 
personal right that might severely limit uses others may make of 
 
 94 Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 
NOVA L. REV. 421, 422 (1990). 
 95 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216 (“[L]imited moral rights protection would do more 
than merely assuage authors’ feelings.  It would also promote First Amendment values.”); 
KWALL, supra note 1, at 54 (“[I]n developing appropriate moral rights protection for the 
United States, it is critical to consider how these protections will impact the public 
domain.”). 
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existing works, particularly those works in the public domain.96  
There are associated concerns that moral rights could impinge on 
downstream fair uses of protected works.  Fair use is generally 
regarded in American copyright law as an important protection for 
free speech.97  However, if an author asserting a moral right could 
prevent an otherwise protected fair use—for example, a parody of 
a work—this would be problematic for the First Amendment 
balance in copyright law.98  Professor Ilhyung Lee has noted that 
VARA—the only specific American moral rights legislation—
expressly makes moral rights subject to fair use in order to 
accommodate these concerns.99 
Another related concern about moral rights has been raised 
with respect to the position of the copyright holder where that 
person is a different person than the original creator.  The concern 
is that it is uncomfortable under American notions of property law 
for a personal right, such as a moral right, potentially to trump a 
property or quasi-property right.  Professor Lee has evocatively 
described this concern: 
Perhaps most jarring to the American psyche is the 
idea of an author’s moral right taking precedence 
over another’s property right. The notion that an 
artist may, in the name of the personal interests in 
the work, prevent the purchaser and holder of title 
in the work from doing with it what she wishes may 
 
 96 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 215 (“To the extent the European [moral rights] regime 
gives authors a broad right to prevent creative appropriations of their existing works, it, 
no less than proprietary copyright, unduly impedes such expression.”); KWALL, supra 
note 1, at 54 (“[I]n developing appropriate moral rights protection for the United States, it 
is critical to consider how these protections will impact the public domain.”). 
 97 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (describing the fair use defense 
in copyright law as an important built-in protection for free speech). 
 98 Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 795, 814 (2001) (“Another example of the potential conflict between moral rights 
and constitutional protections is the author who objects to the alteration or use of her 
work by another who, in turn, claims that such alteration or use is parody or criticism, 
permitted under the doctrine of fair use.  Here, implementation of the traditional droit 
moral may result in prohibiting actions based on the First Amendment’s right of free 
expression.”). 
 99 Id. 
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run contrary to the American socio-legal culture and 
border on the heretical.100 
Professor Lee goes on to suggest that the legislative creation of 
a moral rights doctrine might, on this basis, even be regarded as an 
unconstitutional regulatory taking.101  Other objections to moral 
rights in the United States relate to the expansion in recent decades 
of the kinds of subject matter covered by copyright law.  While 
copyright law now covers works such as computer programs and 
original databases, these works are not the typical subjects of 
moral rights protections as they have “little or no artistic, personal, 
or cultural heritage [and] are ill-suited for moral rights 
protection.”102  Of course, this concern could be accommodated in 
a new moral rights agenda by limiting moral rights coverage to 
more artistic and less functional works.103 
Professor Marshall Leaffer has also raised more market-
oriented concerns about the potential adoption of a moral rights 
agenda within the United States even in the context of works that 
have a significant artistic or cultural dimension: 
Moral rights protection will inherently clash with 
the way many works are created in cultural and 
entertainment industries such as moviemaking, 
publishing, and broadcasting.  These intensely 
collaborative endeavors are exploited through 
subsidiary markets.  For example, motion pictures 
are abridged for television, textbooks are revised 
and translated, and music is synchronized, adapted, 
and broadcast in a multiplicity of forms.  These 
lucrative derivative markets, which attract 
significant investment into the entertainment and 
cultural industries, are regulated by contractual 
agreement.  But an expansive moral rights concept, 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 400. 
 103 KWALL, supra note 1, at 148 (“[M]oral rights should be applicable to works 
manifesting heightened originality with substantial creativity.  If Congress were to follow 
this approach, it would be appropriate to exclude completely works from coverage that 
are largely functional and therefore lacking in significant artistic characteristics.”). 
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presenting a constant threat of legal challenge 
brought by any one or more collaborators, would 
tend to undermine the economic expectations and 
the delicate allocation of rights achieved through 
private negotiation between authors, users, and 
labor unions.  The result may be less financial 
support for such collaborative artistic endeavors, 
ultimately harming the public interest.104 
Contracting parties will be less certain of their rights where 
third party creators are able to assert unexpected moral rights in a 
way that significantly impacts on the performance of the contract.  
Thus, any moral rights agenda needs to be carefully thought out 
and implemented within the United States to ensure that major 
commercial markets are not harmed to the detriment of the 
economy and the public interest.  Of course, thriving entertainment 
industries also raise First Amendment concerns.  Movies, 
television shows, books and the like are all important forms of 
expression protected by the First Amendment.  They are also forms 
of commercial property that may be protected by the takings 
clause.105  The models of moral rights protection proposed recently 
by Professors Netanel and Kwall respectively attempt to strike this 
delicate balance. 
B. The Netanel Model 
[T]he law can—and should—give some 
accommodation to authors’ interest in creative 
control, without excessively burdening creative 
speakers.106 
Drawing on the work of Professor Jessica Litman,107 Professor 
Netanel has proposed a moral rights agenda for the United States 
that emphasizes the right of attribution.108  In particular he focuses 
on the concern that “those who disseminate a creative 
appropriation should be required to label it as an unlicensed 
 
 104 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 387. 
 105 See Lee, supra note 98, at 814. 
 106 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 215. 
 107 Id. (citing JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 185 (2001)). 
 108 See id. (citing LITMAN, supra note 107, at 185).   
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modification of the original work.”109  In this context, the right of 
attribution operates in tandem with a de facto right of integrity to 
ensure that creators are not falsely attributed with distortions of 
their works.  Both Professor Litman and Professor Netanel have 
identified ways in which modern digital technologies can assist 
authors in protecting a right of attribution. 
Professor Litman suggests that a modified version of a work 
posted online could be required to be accompanied by a citation or 
hypertext link to an unaltered copy of the author’s original work.110  
Professor Netanel also suggests that if the focus is on the right of 
attribution, digital technology makes compliance quite simple.111  
The law could merely require copyright management 
information112 that is digitally embedded in the original work to be 
included in a creative appropriation of the work by a downstream 
user.113  This is not much of a stretch from what the law already 
requires under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  
Currently this legislation prohibits the intentional removal, 
alteration, or knowing falsification of copyright management 
information from a protected work.114 
Professor Netanel further stresses data from the Creative 
Commons licensing scheme for copyright works,115 noting that 
most authors utilizing these digital licenses impose attribution 
requirements while significantly fewer authors are concerned about 
the making of unauthorized downstream works.116  It appears 
therefore that Creative Commons licenses are already used to 
protect authors’ attribution rights albeit as part of a contractual 
licensing scheme for use of a copyright work, rather than under 
 
 109 See id. 
 110 Id. (citing LITMAN, supra note 107, at 185). 
 111 Id. at 216. 
 112 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006) (defining copyright management information as 
including information about the ownership of a work and the terms upon which the work 
may be used). 
 113 See NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216. 
 114 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)–(b). 
 115 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 217 (noting that Creative Commons estimates that “as of 
February 2005, authors chose licenses requiring attribution some 94 percent of the time 
and, in contrast, chose licenses prohibiting the making of a derivative work less than one-
third of the time”). 
 116 Id. 
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separate moral rights legislation.  Thus, in today’s Creative 
Commons context, the ability of a creator to protect her attribution 
right will depend on her not having assigned copyright in the work 
to someone else. 
By focusing on the attribution right, Professor Netanel attempts 
to strike a balance between First Amendment values and moral 
rights.  If the emphasis is on attribution, rather than integrity, there 
is much less concern with downstream uses of a copyright work 
being negatively impacted by moral rights.  If downstream users 
are only required to attribute—and maybe to link back to—the 
original work, rather than to curtail their activities in any more 
substantive way, there is much less of a threat to First Amendment 
values than if downstream users are subject to unexpected claims 
by authors that might prevent their expressive activities.  Of 
course, copyright holders can still bring infringement actions to 
prevent unauthorized derivative works in cases where these works 
are not protected as fair uses.117 
Professor Netanel also claims to be promoting First 
Amendment values with his model in the sense that the First 
Amendment encompasses an author’s interest in avoiding forced 
speech: 
[A] requirement that creative appropriators take 
reasonable steps to accord authorship credit for 
underlying works and ensure that audiences 
understand the source of the modified version can 
help to protect authors’ interest in avoiding “forced 
speech. . . .” [W]hile authors do not have a 
cognizable speech interest in preventing another 
from modifying their creative expression or using it 
in a context that is not to their liking, they do have 
such an interest in preventing the impression that 
they endorse a message they find repugnant.118 
Thus, by preserving downstream users’ rights to re-purpose the 
original author’s creation, but by denying them the right to falsely 
 
 117 See Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1888–89 (noting that authors do bring copyright 
lawsuits and send cease and desist letters to creators of fan fiction). 
 118 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216. 
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attribute the repurposed work, Professor Netanel would argue that 
an appropriate balance is struck.  Professor Netanel garners further 
support for his focus on the attribution right by considering some 
of Professor Rebecca Tushnet’s work in the context of fan fiction, 
noting that authorship attribution is an extremely powerful norm in 
that context.119  He also cites evidence that documentary 
filmmakers place significant emphasis on authorship attribution.120 
In further mitigating the potential negative impact of moral 
rights law on downstream creative uses of copyright works, 
Professor Netanel suggests that the attribution right could be 
enforced under a “reasonableness standard rather than a hard-and-
fast rule.”121  A finding of infringement of the attribution right 
might therefore depend to some extent on context.  Thus, the 
enforcement of the right could be eased in cases of noncommercial 
use or in cases where the source of a modified work is obvious to 
its audience, such as in the case of much fan fiction based on, say, 
a popular television series.122 
If Professor Netanel is correct in his intuition that the 
attribution right is more important or acceptable in the United 
States than the integrity right, it is worth considering the extent to 
which this argument would address some of the concerns raised in 
Part II by the supernatural fiction authors.  Two of those 
concerns—those raised by Anne Rice and Charlaine Harris—were 
focused predominantly on unauthorized fan fiction.  Stephenie 
Meyer, on the other hand, while ambivalent about fan fiction was 
certainly concerned about the unauthorized online dissemination of 
her incomplete manuscript for Midnight Sun.123  Would the 
Netanel approach, if implemented in practice, have addressed these 
authors’ concerns in practice? 
The first obvious shortcoming of the Netanel approach in 
addressing Rice’s and Harris’s concerns about fan fiction is that 
 
 119 See id. at 217 (citing Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and 
Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007)). 
 120 See id. (citing ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO AND FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 4–6 (2005)). 
 121 Id. at 216. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See supra note 90–92 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Netanel does not advocate a moral rights agenda that 
substantively impacts downstream creative uses of a work.  Where 
an original author’s objection is to the actual downstream use—the 
creation of the fan fiction—as opposed to the lack of attribution or 
false attribution, the Netanel model would have no application.  
Moreover, as noted above, Professor Netanel notes that fan fiction 
communities already have strong attribution norms,124 suggesting 
that his model would have little practical impact on the way these 
communities currently operate.  Thus, to the extent that popular 
fiction authors are unhappy with the way the system currently 
operates, the Netanel model does not address their concerns at all.  
Their concerns may be addressed by a broader moral rights agenda 
that includes a right of integrity,125 but attribution by itself will not 
likely help. 
None of this is to suggest that authors’ interests should 
necessarily be prioritized over those of their fans.  However, it 
does emphasize the fact that in making choices about adopting a 
moral rights agenda, and the form of an appropriate moral rights 
framework, there will always be winners and losers.126  The 
Netanel model consciously elevates the creative needs of 
downstream users—such as fan fiction communities—over those 
of original authors. 
Even in the absence of any moral rights agenda, authors who 
retain copyright in their works can utilize contractual licenses and 
the copyright law to control the substance of much fan fiction.  
While it is unclear whether fan fiction will infringe copyright as an 
unauthorized derivative work,127 copyright holders nevertheless 
 
 124 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 217 (citing Tushnet, supra note 119, at 135). 
 125 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 387 (noting that the right of integrity includes the right to 
prevent any intentional modification of an original work that would be prejudicial to the 
artist’s honor or reputation). 
 126 See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 14, at 577 (“The [traditional European] doctrine of 
moral rights favors the creator and the public against the entrepreneur and the 
performer.”). 
 127 See Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1872 (noting the debate as to whether fan fiction and 
online remixing is a copyright infringement or excusable fair use); Karjala, supra note 
67, at 32–34 (noting conflicting case law concerning the extent to which works based on 
the Harry Potter books are either regarded as copyright infringements or excusable fair 
uses). 
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can and do make claims for copyright infringement on this basis.128  
Additionally, as noted by Professor Netanel, copyright holders can 
utilize Creative Commons licenses when they release their works 
online.129  These licenses can prohibit the creation of derivative 
works at the author’s option, provided that the author has retained 
copyright in the work.130 
A more difficult question arises in attempting to apply the 
Netanel model to the Midnight Sun controversy.  In this case, as 
with the fan fiction situations, attribution per se was not the key to 
the problem.  Stephenie Meyer was simply upset that unauthorized 
copies of her work—that were attributed to her—were released on 
the Internet before she was ready for people to read them.  This 
situation implicates the relationship between the rights of 
attribution and integrity.  The problem here for Meyer was the 
dissemination of her work in a form in which she did not want 
others to receive it.  Unlike the typical concerns about authorial 
dignity, the Midnight Sun situation did not involve a third party 
revising a work and releasing it under the author’s name in a form 
unapproved by the author.  Rather, it involved a third party 
releasing the author’s own work in a form unapproved by the 
author. 
As noted in Part I.B., Professor Leaffer has suggested that the 
right of attribution will typically include the right of an author to 
prevent the use of her name as the author of a work “in the event of 
a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work that 
would be prejudicial to her honor or reputation.”131  While the 
release of an unauthorized and incomplete early version of a 
manuscript may be prejudicial to an author’s honor or reputation, 
could it really be described as a “distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of the work?”  Again, there is a strong argument that 
the Netanel moral rights model would have no application here. 
 
 128 See Hetcher, supra note 67, at 1888–89 (noting that authors do bring copyright 
lawsuits against creators of fan fiction). 
 129 See NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216–17. 
 130 About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
 131 LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 395. 
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Again, this may well be as it should be.  An author who has 
retained copyright in her unpublished manuscript can use copyright 
law to seek a remedy in situations such as the unauthorized release 
of the manuscript.  However, copyright law and copyright 
remedies are premised on property rights rather than authorial 
dignity, so the copyright model is not necessarily the best fit for 
the perceived harm here.  If the author is looking for an apology or 
some other remedy related to her dignity, she will not find it in 
copyright law.  Of course, there may simply be no remedy that 
addresses the kind of harm suffered by Meyer in this situation.  
While an injunction may be available under copyright law, the 
damage to Meyer’s artistic process was already done.  She felt that 
she had been violated as an author to the extent that she could not 
complete the project.  Neither copyright law nor moral rights law 
may give her any practical comfort at the end of the day. 
Of course, this depends on the breadth of one’s conception of 
moral rights.  While neither of Berne’s Article 6bis rights would 
likely help authors like Meyer in the case of unauthorized 
distributions of their own work, some of the broader civil moral 
rights systems might cover this situation.  Formulations of moral 
rights that include the right to withdraw the work from publication 
might be the kind of right that authors like Meyer would really be 
seeking in situations like the Midnight Sun dilemma.132 
However, the applicability of a right of withdrawal, even in 
countries that maintain the right, can be limited in practice and 
may not cover every situation in which an author desires to 
withdraw a work from the public.  As Professor Kwall has noted, 
even in countries that maintain a right of withdrawal, the right 
tends to be rarely exercised in practice.133  This is because in 
countries like France, Germany, and Italy,134 the right to withdraw 
 
 132 See id. at 389 (noting that some formulations of moral rights include the right to 
withdraw the work from publication); Roeder, supra note 14, at 556 (noting that some 
European countries protect the right to withdraw and destroy the work as amongst the 
author’s moral rights). 
 133 See KWALL, supra note 1, at 44. 
 134 See id. (noting that France, Germany, and Italy maintain a right to withdraw a work 
as part of their moral rights law). 
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only applies to published works,135 and only applies in situations 
where the author can affirmatively establish severe harm as a result 
of the inability of the work to represent her personal convictions.136  
Thus, under current European formulations of the right to 
withdraw, the dissemination of an unpublished manuscript that 
does not cause severe harm to the author by misrepresenting her 
current “convictions or spirit”137 would not likely infringe the 
right. 
The fact that the Netanel model does not provide a remedy for 
any of the authors’ concerns raised in Part II does not of course 
condemn it as an inappropriate moral rights agenda for the United 
States.  The aim of this discussion has merely been to demonstrate 
that even the most carefully thought out moral rights models will 
have to strike a balance somewhere,  and cannot address 
everybody’s concerns.  Professor Netanel’s focus—like Professor 
Litman’s and Professor Tushnet’s—is on encouraging creativity in 
downstream markets while protecting authorial dignity in the 
context of attribution.  It is a thought-provoking model that may 
well be worth adopting.  However, it would still appear to fall short 
of the United States’ international obligations under the Berne 
Convention as it does not include the right of integrity.  It would 
also have to be developed to ensure that it is in compliance with 
other aspects of Berne, such as the term of the attribution right.138 
C. The Kwall Model 
Societies that care about fostering the creation of 
works of authorship should take seriously the idea 
that authors are concerned about safeguarding the 
textual integrity of their works . . . . [C]ompelling 
 
 135 See id. (“The right of withdrawal is best understood as a means of allowing authors 
to ‘retract the economic rights that they may have assigned or licensed to a third party in 
order to enable that third party to exploit the work.’” (quoting Cyrill P. Rigamonti, 
Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 362 (2006))). 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. (“[T]he author . . . enjoys the right to determine whether a work should be 
withdrawn from the public if it no longer reflects the author’s convictions or spirit.”). 
 138 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis(2) (“The rights granted to the author 
in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights . . . .”). 
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reasons exist for introducing noneconomic, or 
inspirationally based, motivations into the dialogue 
on authors’ rights.139 
Professor Kwall’s model for a new moral rights agenda for the 
United States is significantly broader than Professor Netanel’s 
model.  In particular, Professor Kwall rejects the notion that an 
American moral rights agenda should focus solely on the right of 
attribution.140  As Professor Kwall’s agenda is fairly broad, she 
consciously focuses on general themes rather than technical 
details.141  Her model would exclude from moral rights coverage 
works that are largely functional as opposed to highly artistic.142  
This would address concerns about the improper extension of 
moral rights to works that do not necessarily reflect the personality 
of the author such as computer software and largely functional 
databases.143 
Somewhat consistently with Professor Netanel’s approach, 
Professor Kwall’s model would include broad protections for 
attribution rights and narrower protections for integrity rights.144  
Under the Kwall model, the attribution right would incorporate the 
right to publish anonymously or pseudonymously and to later 
 
 139 KWALL, supra note 1, at 9. 
 140 See id. at 144 (“[A]lthough attribution may present a more clear-cut, and easier to 
administer area than the right of integrity, both are deeply concerned with the author’s 
dignity and esteem.  In order for a right of integrity to be viable in the United States, it 
will need to balance carefully competing interests and incorporate a large degree of 
cabining measures.”). 
 141 See id. at 147 (“The proposal I develop . . . does not attempt to address every 
possible issue in connection with enhanced moral rights legislation.  On the contrary, it 
explores some general themes and offers guidance with respect to how these themes can 
impact the mechanics of a new statute.”). 
 142 See id. at 148 (“[M]oral rights should be applicable to works manifesting heightened 
originality with substantial creativity.  If Congress were to follow this approach, it would 
be appropriate to exclude completely works from coverage that are largely functional and 
therefore lacking in significant artistic characteristics.”). 
 143 See LEAFFER, supra note 3, at 400 (“[S]ome works are simply not appropriate for 
moral rights, such as computer programs, databases, and other functional works.  These 
kinds of works that have little or no artistic, personal, or cultural heritage are ill-suited for 
moral rights protection.”).  
 144 KWALL, supra note 1, at 149 (“[A]ttribution rights should be defined far more 
broadly than integrity rights.”). 
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claim authorship if the author so desired.145  This is important in 
Professor Kwall’s view because these authorship decisions 
“represent branding choices that can be a fundamental part of the 
author’s meaning and message.”146 
In terms of remedies, Professor Kwall would prefer that 
violations of the attribution right be enforced by declaratory relief 
that governs future distributions of an infringing version of a 
work.147  Damages should generally not be an available remedy for 
an infringement of the attribution right because of the typically 
noneconomic nature of the injury to the author.148 
In terms of the right of integrity, Professor Kwall suggests that 
the right should be narrowly tailored to “vindicate the author’s 
right to inform the public about the original nature of her artistic 
message and the meaning of her work.”149  This could be achieved 
through a requirement that the downstream modifier of the work 
provide a disclaimer informing the public of the author’s objection 
to her usage of the work.150  Of course, as recognized by Professor 
Kwall, this assumes that the downstream user is not prevented 
from making the modification to the work under copyright law.151 
As with the attribution right, remedies under the proposed 
integrity right should generally be limited to declaratory relief.152  
In the case of the integrity right, the declaratory relief would 
comprise mandating a disclaimer on a downstream use of the 
 
 145 Id. (“[The] author should have the right to publish a work anonymously or 
pseudonymously, and to claim authorship at a later point in time should she so desire.”). 
 146 Id. at 150. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. (“In light of the predominant noneconomic nature of the injury, a damage 
remedy should be eschewed except in the following instances: where a clear showing of 
economic harm exists as a result of the attribution violation; where the violation is 
entirely in the past and future injunctive relief therefore is meaningless; or where 
exceptionally willful violations are involved.”). 
 149 Id. at 151. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. (“[The proposed integrity right] assumes that, absent the proposed right of 
integrity, the actor would otherwise have the unencumbered right to use the author’s 
work pursuant to copyright law.”). 
 152 Id. 
C01_LIPTON_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:40 PM 
572 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:537 
work.153  Professor Kwall further suggests that in order to obtain 
relief, an author must establish that her objections to the use of her 
work are “reasonably credible.”154 
In terms of waiver, Professor Kwall would prefer that neither 
the right of attribution nor integrity should be waivable.155  This is 
because waiver is inconsistent with the notion that the rights 
protect authorial dignity,156 and because allowing waivers 
exacerbates inequalities of bargaining power that often exist 
between creators of works and those with whom they contract.157  
Professor Kwall further notes that because of the limited nature of 
protection for the integrity right under her model, the typical 
justifications for supporting a waiver provision are not present.158  
In other words, where a downstream user is not prevented from 
engaging in creative expression, but is only required to issue a 
disclaimer, that user should not require a waiver of the integrity 
right.  The integrity right does not prevent her from engaging in 
her downstream creative activity. 
Professor Kwall also advocates a system in which moral rights 
last only for the author’s lifetime.159  Although this view is 
inconsistent with the Berne Convention,160 Professor Kwall 
 
 153 Id. (“As with the attribution right, an author should be entitled to enforce the right of 
integrity prospectively through declaratory relief mandating a disclaimer.  Further, an 
author should be unable to enjoin a proposed use accompanied by an appropriate 
disclaimer.  For prior objectionable uses lacking a disclaimer, an author should be able to 
obtain damages in cases involving clear economic harm, willfulness, or where the 
conduct is entirely past and the possibility of a prospective disclaimer is unrealistic.”). 
 154 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 155 Id. at 156 (“In light of this proposal’s circumscribed protections for moral rights, 
formal waivers should be inoperative as a general matter.”). 
 156 Id. at 156–57 (“Given that moral rights are designed to recognize inspirational 
motivations for creativity, any system sanctioning waiver is inconsistent from a 
theoretical standpoint with the justifications for adopting these protections.  In other 
words, if moral rights protections are intended to redress violations of authorship dignity, 
they should not be capable of being waived.”). 
 157 Id. at 157 (“Moreover, allowing waiver exacerbates the disparity of bargaining 
power between authors and those with whom they contract.”). 
 158 See id. 
 159 Id. at 159 (“[F]rom a theoretical standpoint, moral rights protection should exist for 
the author’s lifetime, but not beyond.”). 
 160 Id. at 160 (“[The Berne Convention] provides that the covered rights are to be 
maintained after the author’s death ‘at least until the expiry of the economic rights.’”). 
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supports the model on the basis that no one other than the author 
can “substitute a personal judgment regarding the substance of the 
author’s meaning and message of her work.”161  This includes 
members of the author’s family.162 
Like Professors Litman and Netanel,163 Professor Kwall also 
notes that modern digital technology would be very helpful in 
implementing and enforcing the rights she proposes.164  Where 
compliance with the moral rights focuses on appropriate attribution 
and disclaimers, this is fairly easily achieved digitally, at least with 
works in digital formats.  As noted by Professor Netanel, copyright 
management information is routinely incorporated into digital 
works.165  Other information—such as the way in which the author 
wishes to be attributed or the fact that the author objects to a 
particular downstream treatment of a work—is likewise easily 
incorporated into a digital work.  Taking Professor Kwall’s model 
a step in the direction of Professor Netanel’s model, one could 
suggest that any new moral rights legislation should prevent the 
removal of attribution information or disclaimers. 
Returning, then, to our authors of supernatural fiction from Part 
II, the question arises as to whether Professor Kwall’s model 
would assist with the concerns raised by the authors in relation to 
their works.  As noted in Part III.B, any moral rights model that 
focuses purely on attribution will be of little help for the kinds of 
concerns described in Part II.166  This is because none of the 
authors were particularly concerned about attribution.  All of the 
authors had raised some concerns about unauthorized fan fiction, 
but the concerns had more to do with the existence of the fan 
fiction than with the lack of attribution of the original work. 
 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. (“No one, not even the author’s spouse and children, can substitute a personal 
judgment regarding the substance of the author’s meaning and message of her work.”). 
 163 See supra Part III.B. 
 164 KWALL, supra note 1, at 154 (“[I]n many instances digital technology and the 
Internet offer efficient and inexpensive means of complying with these suggested 
reforms.”). 
 165 NETANEL, supra note 9, at 216. 
 166 See supra Part III.B.  
C01_LIPTON_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:40 PM 
574 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:537 
In fact, in her model, Professor Kwall particularly suggests that 
enforcement of moral rights may generally be relaxed in the case 
of parodies.  In the context of a parody, the source of the material 
being parodied is obvious from the context, and it is also obvious 
that the work is unlikely to have been authorized by the original 
creator.167  Thus, in Professor Kwall’s words, “when works are 
parodied, an implicit disclaimer essentially exists.”168  While 
parody does raise separate issues from fan fiction, there are clear 
parallels.  In both cases, the author may object to a downstream 
expressive activity that makes unauthorized use of her original 
work.  Further, in both cases it is relatively clear from the context: 
(a) that the author was the creator of the original work upon which 
the new work is based; and (b) that the author is unlikely to have 
formally approved creation of the new work.  Thus, applying 
Professor Kwall’s thoughts about parody to fan fiction, a new 
moral rights agenda may not even require attribution or disclaimers 
in the context of fan fiction. 
Whether or not attribution or disclaimers would be required for 
fan fiction under the Kwall model, the concerns raised by Anne 
Rice, Charlaine Harris, and to some extent by Stephenie Meyer 
about fan fiction are not fully addressed by the model.  Both Rice 
and Harris vehemently object to fan fiction—Rice to the point of 
expressly attempting to ban it.169  Thus, simply requiring that 
authors of fan fiction attribute the original source and issue a 
disclaimer does little to help these authors, particularly given that 
attribution and disclaimers may effectively be implied in the fan 
fiction context in any event. 
Again, this may well be as it should be.  The entire thrust of 
Professor Kwall’s model, as with Professor Netanel’s, is to 
preserve First Amendment values and a vibrant public domain.  
 
 167 KWALL, supra note 1, at 163 (“It is precisely because the public understands that . . . 
parodies are not authorized that the public is not deceived as to the persona’s involvement 
in parody.  Moreover, parody lacks the necessary public linkage between the author and 
the externalized commodity because it is apparent that the author has not authorized the 
use.”). 
 168 Id. at 159. 
 169 Anne Rice, Anne’s Message to Fans, Anne Rice Readers Interaction, 
ANNERICE.COM, http://www.annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-MessagesToFans.html (“I 
do not allow fan fiction.  The characters are copyrighted.”) (last visited July 14, 2010). 
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Thus, a moral rights agenda that would effectively ban or severely 
restrict fan fiction activities is well outside the aims of these 
models.  As noted in Part III.B, it is possible that copyright law 
may in fact do some of this work in cases where fan fiction is 
found to be an unauthorized derivative work and not justified 
under the fair use defense.170  There are arguments both ways on 
these questions.  A number of commentators suggest that much fan 
fiction, even if an apparent infringement of the derivative work 
right,171 is nevertheless excusable as a fair use,172 notably in the 
case of noncommercial fan fiction.173 
Again, the Midnight Sun scenario is potentially more 
problematic than questions about fan fiction, even under the Kwall 
model.  As noted in Part III.B, Meyer’s concern about the 
unauthorized postings of Midnight Sun on the Internet had nothing 
to do with attribution.  She was concerned with her unfinished 
work being made available to the public before she was ready to 
share it.174  Even an integrity right is of little use here because a 
third party did not distort, modify or mutilate her work, but rather 
posted it without authority.  Interestingly, Meyer’s self-imposed 
remedy consisted of her own disclaimer of sorts: 
I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight 
Sun.  It was only an incomplete draft; the writing is 
messy and flawed and full of mistakes.  But how do 
I comment on this violation without driving more 
people to look for the illegal posting?  It has taken 
me a while to decide how and if I could respond.  
But to end the confusion, I’ve decided to make the 
draft available here (at the end of this post).  This 
 
 170 See supra Part III.B. 
 171 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) (reserving the right to create derivative works as an 
exclusive right of the copyright holder). 
 172 Hetcher, supra note 67 (noting that there is a strong argument that much remixing 
and fan fiction is fair use). 
 173 Id. at 1907–12 (applying a fair use analysis to typical noncommercial fan fiction and 
arguing that much noncommercial fan fiction is likely to be fair use). 
 174 Stephenie Meyer, Midnight Sun: Edward’s Version of Twilight, 
STEPHENIEMEYER.COM (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun. 
html. 
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way, my readers don’t have to feel they have to 
make a sacrifice to stay honest.175 
She is basically saying that the draft she has released online is 
not in a form that she wants her fans to read, but she understands 
that some people will want to read it anyway.  She would rather 
they read her official version so they can “stay honest.”176  This is 
somewhat analogous to Professor Kwall’s idea of using 
disclaimers as a remedy for the integrity right.  Professor Kwall’s 
disclaimers work similarly by effectively saying that the work in 
question is not in a form the original creator has authorized.177  The 
idea is to maintain the original author’s dignitary interests in her 
work without stifling downstream creativity.  Meyer’s use of a 
disclaimer with respect to her own work serves much the same 
function.  It suggests that she has not truly supported release of  the 
work in the form in which she has ultimately released it but she 
understands the public interest in accessing the work so she is 
prepared to make that sacrifice.  While Professor Kwall’s focus is 
on preserving a vibrant public domain, and Meyer’s focus is on 
supporting her fans who want to read the work, the end result is 
similar.  At the end of the day, more creative work is released for 
public consumption than would otherwise be the case, but the 
author’s objections to the form of the work are publicly noted. 
As with the fan fiction examples, it is possible that Meyer 
could have used copyright law to obtain injunctions against the 
unauthorized postings of her incomplete manuscript.  However, as 
noted in Part III.B, the injuries she claims to have suffered have 
more to do with her own artistic integrity than with concerns about 
pecuniary advantage.178  She seems more concerned with the way 
in which the unauthorized release of the manuscript has interfered 
with her creative processes than with her ability to actually control 
the unauthorized distributions.  In her response to the unauthorized 
postings, she opts for more distribution of the work by officially 
reproducing it on her own website, but at the same time she 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See supra note 167. 
 178 See supra Part III.B. 
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withdraws her earlier promise to her fans to complete the 
manuscript. 
CONCLUSION 
What conclusions might be drawn from the above discussion of 
recent American moral rights models juxtaposed against comments 
by supernatural fiction authors about preferred uses of their works?  
Focusing first on the moral rights models, it seems clear that the 
new moral rights agendas proposed by Professors Netanel and 
Kwall are moving away from the notion of compliance with the 
requirements of the Berne Convention.  Professor Netanel’s model 
falls short of Berne obligations by focusing only on the right of 
attribution and setting aside the right of integrity.179  Professor 
Kwall’s model, whilst incorporating a right of integrity, includes 
only a narrow protection for the right based on a requirement of 
disclaimers placed on unauthorized reworkings of an original 
work.180  This may, in fact, be in compliance with Berne, as the 
Convention says nothing about precisely how moral rights are to 
be enforced within domestic legal systems.181  Nevertheless, 
Professor Kwall’s model falls short of Berne compliance in 
requiring that the suggested moral rights terminate on the death of 
the original author.182 
The reasons that both the Netanel model and the Kwall model 
are more restricted than the Berne requirements have much to do 
with the need within the United States to incorporate powerful 
constitutional guarantees such as the right to free speech under the 
First Amendment and potentially concerns about unauthorized 
takings.183  It may be the case that the United States is not in a 
position to fully comply with its Berne obligations consistently 
with its own Constitution.  This may be a problem in the 
 
 179 See supra Part III.B. 
 180 See KWALL, supra note 1, at 151 (suggesting that in cases where a work that is still 
identifiable as the original author’s work is repurposed by a second person, that person 
“should be required to provide a disclaimer adequate to inform the public of the author’s 
objection to the modification or contextual usage”). 
 181 See generally Berne Convention, supra note 2. 
 182 KWALL, supra note 1, at 160. 
 183 See supra Part III.A. 
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international arena going forward.  However, in the meantime it 
may be appropriate for scholars like Professors Netanel and Kwall 
to advocate moral rights agendas that are limited consistently with 
constitutional values. 
Both the Netanel model and the Kwall model place significant 
emphasis on the right of attribution as a right that is consistent with 
constitutional values and a right that is capable of giving effect to 
powerful conceptions of authorial dignity.184  Both professors 
further note the usefulness of modern digital technologies in 
facilitating compliance with their moral rights agendas.185  
Professor Kwall extends on the attribution right by incorporating a 
limited right of integrity in her model that is enforceable generally 
by disclaimer.186  Again, this is likely consistent with American 
constitutional values and can take advantage of available digital 
technologies for effective enforcement. 
While likely consistent with constitutional values, neither the 
Netanel model nor the Kwall model redresses the harms alleged by 
the supernatural fiction authors discussed in Part II.  Again, this 
may be perfectly appropriate.  Both models, in fact, consciously 
seek to protect fan fiction—and some other expressive uses of 
protected works187—against prohibitive and potentially 
monopolizing claims by authors.188  The adoption of a moral rights 
agenda will always necessitate a careful balancing act between the 
rights of original authors, those with whom they contract to publish 
and disseminate their works, and audiences for their works.  The 
kinds of balances sought to be struck by Professors Netanel and 
Kwall consciously attempt to prioritize downstream creative uses 
of works against author complaints, except to the extent that the 
downstream uses harm the author by creating a false impression 
about the author’s intended meaning or message. 
 
 184 See supra Part III.B; Part III.C. 
 185 See supra Part III.B; Part III.C. 
 186 See supra Part III.C. 
 187 See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 1, at 163 (noting the importance of protecting parody 
from excessive moral rights claims). 
 188 Id.; NETANEL, supra note 9, at 215 (noting concerns that broad European-style moral 
rights protections could impede downstream uses of protected works). 
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If this is the accepted aim of a new moral rights agenda, then 
downstream uses such as fan fiction and parody should not be 
prohibited by new moral rights laws, although disclaimers may be 
required in some cases.  Of course, none of this speaks to the 
extent to which copyright law may negatively impact these 
downstream uses.  It is still an open question whether much fan 
fiction is an infringement of the derivative work right under 
copyright law or rather may be excused as a fair use.  The Netanel 
and Kwall moral rights models each side-step this issue.  Professor 
Netanel’s model simply has no impact on this question because it 
focuses on attribution, rather than  integrity, the latter right being 
the one typically implicated in the fan fiction context.  Professor 
Kwall’s model would only apply the moral right of integrity in 
cases where the downstream expressive use was not otherwise 
prohibited by copyright law.  In other words, her model assumes 
the inapplicability of copyright law to a particular use for the right 
of integrity—and associated disclaimer remedy—to be 
applicable.189 
One of the more useful takeaways from this discussion might 
be that both copyright law and moral rights law require important 
balancing acts between the interests of multiple stakeholders.  
Even the most well thought out models will have to prioritize 
certain interests over others.  Thus, in order to preserve First 
Amendment values in the United States, it may be the case that 
authors simply lose the ability to control a number of downstream 
uses of their work.  Savvy authors with sufficient bargaining power 
may choose to impose restrictive copyright license terms on 
downstream uses of their work.  However, not all creators have 
sufficient bargaining power to protect their interests in this way.  
Many do not retain copyright in their works.  Additionally, in 
situations where there is no contract—such as the Midnight Sun 
scenario described in Part II—contractual restrictions are 
irrelevant. 
 
 189 See KWALL, supra note 1, at 151 (noting, for example, with respect to her proposed 
right of integrity that her proposal “assumes that, absent the proposed right of integrity, 
the actor would otherwise have the unencumbered right to use the author’s work pursuant 
to copyright law”). 
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If one adopts a moral rights agenda based on ideas advocated 
by Professors Netanel or Kwall, authors are likely to find 
themselves relying increasingly on copyright and contract law to 
protect the kinds of interests identified in Part II.  There is nothing 
necessarily wrong with this result as a matter of practice.  
However, it is useful in debating new moral rights agendas to 
identify and acknowledge the kinds of interests that are unlikely to 
be protected by such proposals.  Authors may gain some comfort 
from thinking about alternative methods for protecting interests 
that are unlikely to be covered by moral rights.  Alternatively, 
authors may over time become more comfortable with the idea of 
certain kinds of uses of their works, such as fan fiction.  Stephenie 
Meyer may be right in thinking that fan fiction is a good way for 
new writers to cut their teeth within the fiction medium, while 
hoping that they ultimately devise their own unique characters and 
scenarios for their own uses.190 
 
 
 190 Genet, supra note 82 (“As long as the writers of [fan fiction] move on from it.  I 
think it’s sad to spend so much energy on something you can’t own.  And that makes me 
a little bit sad because all these talented kids should be, ya know, get your story out from 
under the bed [sic] and get it out there.” (quoting Stephenie Meyer)). 
